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Abstract: 
This article contributes to the developing literature on prime ministerial performance in the 
UK by applying a critical reading of Stephen Skowronek’s account of leadership in ‘political 
time’ to evaluate David Cameron’s premiership. This, we propose, better understands the 
inter-relationship of structure and agency in prime ministerial performance than existing 
frameworks, particularly those based on Greenstein’s and Bulpitt’s approaches. We identify 
Cameron as a disjunctive prime minister but find it necessary to significantly develop the 
model of disjunctive leadership beyond that offered by Skowronek. We identify the warrants 
to authority, strategies and dilemmas associated with disjunctive leadership in the UK. We 
argue that Cameron was relatively skilful in meeting many of the challenges confronting an 
affiliated leader of a vulnerable regime. However, his second term exposed deep fractures in 
the regime which proved beyond Cameron’s skills as a disjunctive leader.  
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Research highlights: 
 
This article: 
 
 Contributes to the debate about the best theoretical frameworks for evaluating prime 
ministerial performance in the UK.  
 Argues that an historical institutionalist framework is able to address the major 
shortcoming of existing frameworks, namely evaluating prime ministerial 
performance in the structural context of the political environment in which holders of 
that office act. 
 Adapts Stephen Skowronek’s account of the performance of US presidents to the 
constitutional, institutional and political circumstances of the UK polity and 
significantly develops Skowronek’s account of regime vulnerability and the 
characteristics and constraints of disjunctive leadership  
 Applies this adapted model for the purposes of a systematic evaluation of David 
Cameron’s premiership. This identifies that although Cameron was relatively 
successful in negotiating the challenges and constraints of disjunctive prime 
ministerial leadership in his first term he made commitments which, in his second 
term, exposed key fault lines in the regime and proved beyond Cameron’s skills as a 
disjunctive leader to manage.  
  
Introduction 
 
Assessments of prime ministerial performance are ubiquitous in contemporary UK politics. 
Print, broadcast and social media provide running commentaries (see, for example, Blair 
2007). Opinion polls collect popular assessments of prime ministers while valence 
politics renders such attitudes increasingly electorally salient (Whiteley, Clarke, Sanders, and 
Stewart 2013). Biographers find evaluation of prime ministerial performance an irresistible 
enterprise (Marquand 2011). But such assessments of performance are frequently 
idiosyncratic. Where evaluation employs any criteria, these are typically implicit and adrift of 
a theoretical framework. Comparisons, where offered, tend toward the casual rather than the 
systematic.  
 
This paper makes an early contribution to what will doubtless become a substantial literature 
evaluating David Cameron’s premiership between 2010 and 2016. Its broader contribution is 
towards the development of theoretically informed but empirically grounded assessments of 
performance which are explicitly attentive to the structural conditions in which UK prime 
ministers exercise agency. The paper begins by reviewing existing models for evaluating UK 
prime ministerial performance, principally those based on Greenstein’s (2001) and Bulpitt’s 
(1986) approaches. The case is then made for an alternative framework which applies to the 
UK a critical reading of Stephen Skowronek’s historical institutionalist analysis of the US 
presidency. After outlining the modifications necessary to Skowronek’s approach, Cameron 
is identified as a disjunctive prime minister. We identify the warrants to authority, the 
strategies, and dilemmas associated with disjunctive leadership in the UK. This allows us to 
undertake a systematic evaluation of Cameron’s premiership. We argue that although 
Cameron enjoyed a relatively successful first term, his repertoire of disjunctive leadership led 
him into commitments which exposed deep fractures within the British polity in his second.  
 
 
Models of prime ministerial performance 
 
 
It is easier to ask than to answer the question, what makes for prime ministerial success or 
failure. Beyond the rankings of expert surveys (for example, Theakston and Gill, 2006), the 
existing literature offers two main options to conceptualise, interpret and evaluate British 
prime ministers’ performance. Derived from Greenstein’s (2001) assessments of US 
presidents, the leadership style/skills model focuses on prime ministerial performance in 
relation to: public communication; organisational capacity; political skills; policy vision; 
cognitive style (how they process advice and take decisions); and emotional intelligence (see 
Theakston, 2007; 2011; 2012). In contrast, the statecraft model focuses on how British 
leaders secure office and power through party management, winning the battle of ideas, 
developing a successful electoral strategy, and demonstrating ‘governing competence’ 
(Bulpitt, 1986; Buller and James, 2012; Clarke et al, 2015).  
 
In analysing how prime ministers understand and conduct leadership roles, and assess how 
effectively they perform them, both models advance the debate from recurrent questions 
about prime ministerial power (or ‘predominance’ in contemporary formulations) and 
arguments about systemic labels or trends (e.g. ‘presidentialisation’). The difficulty both 
models share is accounting for the environment in which leaders operate, and the 
opportunities, challenges and constraints they face. The nexus between leaders’ personal 
qualities and the demands of the times is central to their effectiveness, as Greenstein has 
conceded:  
 
The capacity of the president to make a difference is a function not only of his personal 
attributes, but also the political environment in which they are brought to bear. A president 
who is well suited to serve in one setting may be ill suited for another (Greenstein 2005 
quoted in Theakston 2007, 60).  
 
But Greenstein does not develop this aspect of the model in any detailed or extended way.   
 
The statecraft model goes further in incorporating several aspects of structural context into 
leadership evaluation (Buller and James, 2012), including electoral constraints, public 
attitudes towards policies, the international situation and the relationship between foreign and 
domestic policy, and pre-eminently economic factors. Buller and James (2015) have valuably 
strengthened the statecraft model’s engagement with this structural context.  In their account 
the complementarity of prime ministerial objectives with structural conditions is an important 
determinant of prime ministerial performance. In addition, they acknowledge the dynamic 
character of the structural context.  A prime minister will find a stable and predictable 
structural context easier to govern within than one that changes unexpectedly or dramatically. 
But Buller and James have yet to provide a framework that can be used systematically to 
understand and compare the relationship between leaders and their contexts, or explain 
patterns of change over time (Buller and James 2015, 80-83).  
 
This paper argues that an historical institutionalist account, based on a critical and extended 
reading of Skowronek’s (1993) theory of US presidential leadership permits incorporation of 
‘the changing universe of political action’ (Skowronek 2011, 77) in a fashion that these other 
models do not presently allow. In contrast to Greenstein, Skowronek (1993, 19) rejects a 
focus on the leaders’ characteristics and political skills, arguing they have almost nothing to 
do with success or failure in office, and reveal little about the political impact of presidential 
leadership. Equally, he conceives of the leadership ‘test’ in a broader and more demanding 
way than the statecraft model’s primary focus on ‘how many elections [leaders] win’ (Buller 
and James 2015, 79). 
 
Skowronek’s (1993) account of leadership in the context of political time and regime cycles 
provides a way of understanding the dynamic inter-relationship of structure and agency in 
analysing, comparing and explaining leadership performance. The challenges and 
opportunities presidents face, and the authority they have, according to Skowronek, 
essentially depend on whether they are opposed to or are affiliated with the prevailing 
‘regime’ (understood as a set of ideas, values, policy paradigms and programmes, and the 
associated pattern of political interests and institutional supports), and the extent to which 
that ‘regime’ is itself resilient or vulnerable (table 1). 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Put briefly, political time involves cycles of regime maintenance, decay and challenge, crisis, 
replacement and rebuilding as problems emerge and are confronted, policies evolve, and 
political support and authority accumulates or dissipates. Different challenges are posed for 
leaders depending on their stance towards the regime and their place in political time. 
Leaders supporting an existing regime which is working well and is widely supported 
(leaders of articulation), can be expected to operate within and manage the existing policy 
framework. At most they are ‘orthodox innovators’ rather than attempting fundamental 
reforms. The ambitions of pre-emptive leaders – who repudiate an existing regime and seek 
to replace it – are, however, ultimately frustrated and blocked by the continuing strength of a 
resilient political order. Disjunctive leaders are challenged to prop up a failing regime, 
keeping the show on the road in the face of mounting problems and diminishing support and 
authority. Exploiting the opportunities created by the breakdown of vulnerable regimes, 
reconstructive leaders are able to develop and implement new policy frameworks, and 
assemble new coalitions of support around a new political order.  
 
Such a model, applied to the UK premiership, shares much in common with James’ (2016) 
account of neo-statecraft theory as historical institutionalism. Both present macro, polity-
wide perspectives cognisant of historical context, critical junctures and context dependent 
regularities. The critical reading and application of Skowronek developed below also 
acknowledges the dynamic character of the governing context stressed by Buller and James 
(2015). However, it differs and ‘adds value’ beyond recent statecraft approaches (Buller and 
James, 2015; Clarke et al, 2015; James, 2016). Firstly, where statecraft theory identifies 
electoral incentives as the primary motivation for actors, we focus upon the motivations (and 
constraints and opportunities) associated with stances toward the political regime. Secondly, 
we argue that Skowronek’s approach – centred on the three ‘orderings’ of presidential power 
in terms of the constraining effects of the constitution, institutions and political regimes – 
compensates for the lack of systematicity in Buller & James’ considerations of the ‘layering’ 
of structural constraints on political leaders. Thirdly, and partly as a result of the above, 
whereas statecraft theory regards ‘decisions about how much to ‘compensate’ leaders 
governing in difficult contexts’ as ‘nigh-on impossible’ (Buller and James 2015: 82), 
Skowronek’s approach permits broad comparisons based on prime ministerial attitudes 
towards the regime and its resilience/vulnerability.  
 
Applying Skowronek to British prime ministers 
 
Skowronek’s model has been applied to Australia and has potential applications elsewhere 
(Laing and McCaffrie 2013). However, it needs adaptation to the constitutional, institutional 
and political characteristics of a Westminster system (Laing and McCaffrie 2013, 84-89; 
Heffernan 2005). These differences are well understood and do not need detailing extensively 
here. Firstly, Cabinet government deprives even dominant prime ministers of the authority a 
US president can assert. Prime ministers can sometimes lead from the front, but also have to 
routinely consult, bargain, and compromise within the executive. Consequently, Westminster 
systems may provide ‘less pure examples of prime ministers standing in opposition to the 
political orthodoxy as either reconstructors or pre-emptors’ (Laing and McCaffrie 2013, 85). 
Conversely, a fusion of powers and relatively disciplined parties can grant prime ministers a 
legislative dominance that presidents envy. Even disjunctive prime ministers facing 
backbench dissent will still get most of their major legislation through parliament (Laing and 
McCaffrie 2013, 87). 
 
Secondly, Prime ministers confront an organised and institutionalised Opposition possessing 
more authority and legitimacy than the forces opposing a US president. The behaviour of 
Opposition parties can constrain or facilitate prime ministerial success. For example, 
Opposition parties can contribute to the success of reconstructive prime ministers (McCaffrie, 
2013), whether strengthening the government by their own ineptitude, internal divisions and 
ineffectiveness, or by accepting the government’s agenda and consolidating reconstruction 
when they return to office.  Furthermore, Opposition leaders are themselves positioned in 
political time. For example, an orthodox innovator prime minister is likely to face a different 
challenge to their authority from a pre-emptive Opposition leader than an opponent in the 
same orthodox innovator mode. A disjunctive prime minister facing an effective insurgent 
opponent with a reconstructive agenda will find their room for manoeuvre curtailed. For 
those who become prime minister after a period leading the Opposition, the transition 
experience, and the commitments made and pressures faced during it, may affect or constrain 
their premiership in ways that a president may not encounter, particularly if circumstances 
change radically during that period. 
 
Thirdly, compared to the presidential system, political parties are more important to prime 
ministerial authority (Heppell, 2013b). In particular, prime ministers enjoy less security of 
tenure than a president. Failing prime ministers are vulnerable to removal by parties nervous 
about electoral defeat. The security of tenure of presidents, even during ‘prolonged and 
dramatic failures’, may mean therefore that the US provides ‘clearer examples of disjunctive 
leadership’ (Laing and McCaffrie 2013, 88). Able to serve without term limits as long as their 
parties and voters will support them, long-serving prime ministers may also find political 
time changing around them. As new circumstances affect the regime’s viability, the 
leadership challenge they face may alter, so that they move from one of Skowronek’s 
leadership types to another (Laing and McCaffrie 2013, 88-89, 98).  
 
Classifying David Cameron in Political Time 
 
Having established that Skowronek’s model can be employed in the British context, we now 
turn to identifying Cameron’s position in political time.  To do so, we need to answer two 
questions. Firstly, was Cameron an opponent or affiliate of the established regime? Secondly, 
did Cameron encounter a vulnerable or resilient regime?  
 
Cameron: opponent or affiliate of the regime? 
 
The concept of regime has been variously employed in British politics. For Bulpitt, for 
example, regimes are simply ‘structures persisting over time’ (2008, 61). Drawing upon the 
regulation school, Jessop (see, for example, 2007) understands regimes as the prevailing 
relationship between production, distribution and consumption. Following Banaszak et al 
(2003) however, we characterize the political regime of early twenty-first century UK politics 
as centred firstly upon a particular configuration of state responsibilities. The primary 
responsibility of the political regime Cameron inherited was to respond to globalisation by 
seeking to entice (or retain) internationally mobile capital. This involved the privatisation of 
nationalised industries, reorienting monetary policy towards stability, creating a ‘light touch’ 
regulatory environment, maintaining tax competitiveness, and creating a flexible labour 
market with an adequate skills base. However, crucially, it also involved uploading 
responsibilities to supranational organisations, most controversially in the case of the EU, 
downloading responsibilities, most notably to sub-state institutions in Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland, and the lateral loading of responsibilities to non-elected bodies including 
quangos and executive agencies, while a process of offloading has reoriented state-society 
relations towards communities, families and charities and to market mechanisms and 
business interests in particular. These responsibilities and relations have also been situated 
within, and justified by, a dominant neoliberal discourse. In an increasingly dealigned 
electorate, valence issues of competence and performance have driven electoral success. The 
electoral coalition underpinning the regime has accordingly been broad but centred upon 
coalitions of the aspirational and entrepreneurial in both the skilled working class and middle 
classes. As turnout has fallen, so electoral attention has shifted toward high-turnout groups, 
particularly affluent and older voters. 
 
However, a regime does not reorder previous relationships wholesale, but undertakes 
‘‘layering’ [of] a new set of institutions on a mass of others that are already in existence’ 
(Nichols and Myers, 2010: 817). As such there are also a set of ‘deep’ sedimented 
imperatives underpinning this and prior regimes. These are embodied in a territorial politics 
prioritising the preservation of the political union between the nations of the UK, a political 
economy prioritising international trade and the interests of finance capital and a foreign 
policy which has sought British influence by maintaining a balance of power in Europe and, 
in the post-war period, commitment to the Anglo-American relationship.   
 
To identify Cameron’s stance towards this regime we systematically reviewed all his 
speeches as Leader of the Opposition. These reveal an equivocal stance towards previous 
governments. Cameron criticised Labour under Blair for ‘dumbing down’ the education 
system, demoralising NHS workers, transferring powers to the EU without sufficient 
democratic warrant and disengaging voters by ‘spin’. But there was also praise for Labour’s 
commitments to improve public service standards, the minimum wage and the Bank of 
England’s operational independence. Furthermore, Cameron sought to distance himself from 
his Thatcherite inheritance stating that ‘there is such a thing as society, it’s just not the same 
thing as the state’ and fashioning himself as the ‘heir to Blair’. Indeed, Cameron borrowed 
heavily from Blairite conceptions of a globalised world – a vision of a transforming world 
economy, driven by technological advance, demanding a modernisation process capable of 
re-synchronising politics, society and economy – but also an insistence upon a concerted 
international response to impending environmental disaster and the spread of radical Islam.  
 
Cameron’s primary innovation was the notion of the ‘post-bureaucratic age’ (Finalyson 
2011). This highlighted the transformative potential of technology to democratise access to 
information previously monopolised by bureaucracies, and to create informed and engaged  
citizens capable of ‘co-producing’ policy and holding government to account more 
effectively. Such notions informed the policy most prominent in Cameron’s speeches 
throughout this period: the Big Society. This sought ‘much higher levels of personal, 
professional, civic and corporate responsibility… where people come together to solve 
problems and improve life for themselves and their communities’ (Conservative Party 2010, 
37). However, such rhetorical commitment to offloading produced few substantial proposals. 
‘Social Action Zones’ – a Big Society take on Thatcher’s Enterprise Zones – and the National 
Citizens Service – a programme to encourage social action among 16 and 17-year-olds – 
were the only noteworthy developments linked to the Big Society during this period. Plans to 
introduce a married couples tax break, stage a referendum on the EU Constitution, withdraw 
from the social chapter and, following the financial crisis, restore the Bank of England’s 
regulation of financial markets and rein in public spending to address the mounting budget 
deficit received greater fanfare. But none of these commitments departed significantly from 
the existing political and institutional configuration of British politics. Indeed, many of 
Cameron’s policy commitments in opposition were ‘negative’ commitments to scrap policies 
which Labour had, or planned to introduce, such as promises to abolish the Human Rights 
Act and ID cards. 
 
Following Blair’s resignation, Cameron’s rhetoric became more antagonistic towards his 
successor. Brown was held responsible for ‘sowing the seeds’ of the financial crisis by 
restructuring financial market regulation and, compounding this error, abandoning 
Conservative spending plans after 1999. Accordingly, Treasury coffers were empty when the 
financial crisis struck (Cameron 2008). Furthermore, by 2009 Cameron was discursively 
articulating the financial crisis as ‘Labour’s debt crisis’. This allowed him, for the first time 
since becoming leader, to establish a clear dividing line between Labour’s profligacy, 
symbolised by ‘spendaholic’ Brown, and a reinvigorated and trustworthy Conservative Party. 
A determined effort followed to undermine Brown’s leadership credentials on the grounds 
that his experience as Chancellor accounted for naught given a financial catastrophe of his 
own making.  
 
However, the significance of Cameron’s hardening rhetoric towards Labour after 2007 
should not be overestimated. This is to be expected as an election nears and, more 
importantly, even at the height of the financial crisis Cameron made clear his objective was 
to rescue the political and institutional settlement that New Labour had imperilled. Cameron 
would defend the regime against statist solutions and leftist narratives which framed the 
financial crisis as a consequence of the withdrawal of the state from management of the 
economy. Furthermore, in office Cameron would not seek radical departures from the 
commitments of his Labour predecessors. The lineage of his government’s economic, 
education and welfare policies, for example, could be traced back to New Labour. Cameron 
pursued what might be understood as ‘Blairism after the crash’; policies which a New Labour 
government could have easily found itself pursuing in a climate of straitened public finances.  
 
Regime vulnerability or resilience? 
 
The question of regime vulnerability or resilience is a more difficult one to resolve. Firstly, 
Skowronek delivers retrospective verdicts. Contemporaneous assessments pose a greater 
challenge. Regime difficulties which appear clear after the event are often ambiguous at the 
time (Hindmoor and McConnell 2013). Secondly, Skowronek’s notion of regime 
vulnerability is poorly operationalised (‘t Hart 2014a, 219; Hoekstra 1999; Nichols and 
Myers 2010; Polsky 2012). Regime vulnerability is a relatively undifferentiated phenomenon 
in Skowronek’s account. Yet, it may manifest itself in various ways. For example, deep 
vulnerabilities may be evident across a narrow range of commitments. Alternatively, regime 
vulnerability may be shallower but present across many governing commitments. Indeed, 
Skowronek fails to provide clear criteria to identify the symptoms of regime vulnerability. 
Overall, it is hard to escape the conclusion that in Skowronek’s account regime vulnerability 
is a residual and expansive condition.  
 
If we reconceive Skowronek’s two-by-two table as a graph on two axes (figure 1) we can 
begin to visualise that regime resilience or vulnerability is not a binary state but a matter of 
degree. This proposition is endorsed by Nichols and Myers (2010) who argue political 
regimes may enter an ‘enervated’ state of high entropy marked by growing incapacity to 
resolve political problems. Such conditions typically increase in intensity, igniting political 
crisis and opening up the potential for reconstructive change. However, such opportunities 
for reconstruction are not always taken or successfully realised. In such circumstances   
enervation increases and the resolution of regime vulnerability becomes a protracted process.  
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
A number of indicators signal an enervated regime. These include completion of the 
substantive programme upon which the regime is founded, decreasing cohesion within the 
coalition supporting the regime, the emergence of new issues and problems, an assertive 
opposition and a crisis atmosphere which calls into question the regime’s philosophy and 
competence and, finally, the increased salience of corruption scandals.   
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
Our assessment is that Cameron encountered a governing regime more vulnerable than any 
time since the early 1980s. Central to this vulnerability were the effects of the 2007-8 
financial crisis. The recession proved longer than any since the Great Depression. Living 
standards only slowly recovered and coincided with an ongoing European sovereign debt 
crisis. Continuing misconduct, including Libor rate manipulation and assisting tax evasion, 
diminished faith in financial institutions. Tax avoidance by multi-nationals generated public 
dismay and political controversy. These political-economic regime vulnerabilities ran in 
parallel with institutional malaise elsewhere. A perception of disconnection between elites 
and the public was abroad. Surveys demonstrated continued distrust of politicians (Phillips 
and Simpson 2015). Parties hostile to the existing regime won unprecedented support and 
further compromised the regime. The SNP’s rise and the 2014 independence referendum 
challenged the UK's territorial integrity. UKIP’s success testified to a constituency of 
disaffected voters ‘left behind’ by recent governments and mobilised disaffection against the 
EU and immigration policy. Commitments beyond Britain’s borders were also under 
question. Defence cuts and the legacies of Afghanistan and Iraq raised doubts about Britain's 
ability and willingness to intervene internationally. Faith in institutions mediating state-
society relations also diminished (figure 1). Phone-hacking and the Leveson Inquiry laid bare 
the absence of ethical and political constraint upon the print media. This, and other episodes, 
also cast doubt on police ethics and competence.  
 
That this represented an enervated regime is confirmed by Hay’s characterisation of this 
period as one of pathology without crisis (2013) and by the presence of several of Nichols 
and Myer’s indicators. As noted above, Cameron’s stance did not contemplate a new 
direction of political development; it defended a mature regime. The regime’s political 
economic pathologies questioned the wisdom of offloading responsibilities to market 
mechanisms and diminished the legitimacy of the business interests associated with the 
regime. This also challenged the supporting discourse of neo-liberalism. Hostility toward the 
EU challenged the wisdom of uploading state responsibilities. This, and the increasing 
salience of other position issues such as immigration and sub-national identities, presented 
first order questions which the regime appeared ill-equipped to address. Moreover, the 
questions concerning the EU and territorial governance placed ‘deep’ regime commitments 
under question. In such circumstances, the coalition associated with the regime showed signs 
of fragmentation which were exploited by the SNP and UKIP.   
 
So, we conclude, Cameron was an affiliate of an enervated regime. However, Crockett’s 
(2012) work suggests that Cameron could be classified as a ‘restoration’ prime minister. For 
Crockett, ‘restoration’ presidents are ‘late regime’ affiliates, entering office a generation or 
more after the regime’s foundation and a substantial interregnum of opposition party control. 
They task themselves with restoring the political regime to that envisaged by its founders. 
Superficially, Cameron might appear to fit this template. He entered office 31 years after 
Thatcher and after a thirteen-year period of Labour rule. However, as noted above, Cameron 
did not seek the restoration of the Thatcherite project. Rather, he distanced himself from 
significant aspects of his Thatcherite inheritance and accepted the greater part of New 
Labour’s adaptations to that regime. Accordingly, we argue that Cameron is best classified as 
a disjunctive prime minister.  
 Characterising and evaluating the disjunctive premiership 
 
Skowronek’s account of disjunctive leadership is considerably less developed than those of 
the politics of articulation, reconstruction or pre-emption. He is nevertheless emphatic; it 
represents ‘the very definition of the impossible leadership situation’ (1993, 39) because, as 
regime affiliates, disjunctive presidents cannot repudiate existing governmental 
commitments. But equally, given the regime’s vulnerability, they cannot convincingly affirm 
those same commitments either. They become ‘consumed by a problem that is really 
prerequisite to leadership, that of establishing any credibility at all.’ (1993, 39) They also 
possess fewer and weaker options to establish their authority. For Skowronek, ‘Authority 
takes the form of a timely set of warrants addressed to the circumstances that brought the 
president to power, warrants that promise to justify and sustain the exercise of presidential 
power.’ (2011, 84) For Skowronek only technocratic warrants are available to disjunctive 
presidents. They reify technique, claim a privileged insight into national problems and a 
special personal dedication to their resolution. Ultimately,   
Anything short of a miraculous solution will pass to the opposition effective control over the 
political definition of the situation… these affiliates stigmatize the current situation as wholly 
untenable... they become the foils for reconstructive leadership, the indispensable premise 
upon which traditional regime opponents generate the authority to repudiate the 
establishment wholesale. (1993, 40) 
Yet, we should be cautious in assuming this dismal and deterministic trajectory applies to 
disjunctive British prime ministers. Firstly, the prime minister’s greater authority makes 
it likely that ‘disjunctive prime ministers will be less obvious failures than disjunctive 
presidents are.’ (Laing and McCaffrie 2013, 87) Secondly, a disjunctive prime minister may 
not automatically cede authority to opponents as Skowronek expects. British opposition 
parties determine their own positioning in political time. They will not inevitably pursue 
reconstructive politics and the regime will be less vulnerable if they affiliate to it. Thirdly, 
UK political regimes have tended to greater resilience than those in the US (see, for example, 
Gamble 2014, 31) and may persist for some considerable time before they are repudiated. 
Finally, it is possible that disjunctive prime ministers can command a wider range of warrants 
for authority than their presidential counterparts.  
Identification of the characteristics and constraints of disjunctive leadership in Britain is 
therefore necessary. Like disjunctive presidents, we would expect disjunctive prime ministers 
to stake claims to governing authority on the basis of their personal expertise and governing 
approach. However, a wider range of warrants beyond those proposed by Skowronek should 
theoretically be available. Firstly, given regime vulnerability, we might expect disjunctive 
prime ministers to lower expectations by conveying the scale of national difficulties and the 
absence of straightforward solutions. Secondly, we might expect them to supplement their 
technocratic warrants with calls for national unity and reconciliation as the regime comes 
under strain.  
Similarly, we anticipate several strategies to manage the vulnerable regime. One option is to 
buy time and wait out events in the hope that conditions will change. If such an option is not 
available then disjunctive prime ministers may pursue adaptive strategies to attempt to 
forestall crisis and reduce enervation, particularly policy u-turns and ‘inter-paradigm 
borrowing’ (Hay 2013, 23). Such strategies, however, invite dilemmas. U-turns erode claims 
to governing competence. Accusations of ideological inconsistency accompany inter-
paradigm borrowing. Both may magnify the problems of party management confronting 
disjunctive prime ministers. Indeed, disjunctive prime ministers are likely to be viewed by 
partisans as pragmatists adrift of ideological anchors. In such circumstances populist and 
maverick figures may emerge to focus disaffection with the established regime. Likewise, 
growing disillusion with the governing parties affiliated to the regime is likely to find 
expression in increased support for insurgent parties, generating further pressure upon the 
regime.  
Evaluating Cameron’s premiership 
 
To evaluate Cameron’s premiership we need to identify criteria to distinguish degrees of 
success among disjunctive prime ministers. In Skowronek’s account disjunctive presidents 
clearly have scope to exercise individual agency. Carter is portrayed as more successful than 
Franklin Pierce in navigating the constraints of the disjunctive presidency, for example. 
However, it has been left to Laing and McCaffrie (2015) to develop a framework for more 
systematic evaluation of disjunctive presidents. Firstly, their personal success in attaining 
policy goals, personal popularity and, re-election can be assessed. Their ability to prepare for 
regime collapse and minimise electoral damage (partisan regime success) can also be gauged. 
Finally, disjunctive presidents can be distinguished by their normative success - upholding 
the Constitution and maintaining trust in government while engaging in policy 
experimentation that will benefit their successors.  
 
This framework represents a significant advance on Skowronek’s implication that the 
‘impossible leadership situation’ inevitably begets failure. The distinction between personal 
and partisan regime success is particularly useful. For example, a personally popular 
disjunctive prime minister may dilute the toxic effects of disjunctive leadership on their 
party, secure re-election and forestall regime reconstruction. However, Laing and McCaffrie 
appear to share Skowronek’s assumption that the emergence of a reconstructive alternative is 
an inevitable outcome of a disjunctive presidency. As Nichols and Myers (2010) note, 
enervation may persist under a sequence of disjunctive leaders. It is also unclear why a 
disjunctive leader would attempt policy experiments to prepare for later regime change or 
why they would prioritise electoral damage limitation over efforts to rescue the existing 
regime.  
 
Accordingly, here we advance our own criteria drawing upon our analysis of the disjunctive 
premiership. Our starting point is that disjunctive leaders will seek, wherever possible, to 
address their chief governing dilemma: to preserve the regime they are affiliated to. We do 
not expect a disjunctive prime minister to resolve the fundamental problems facing the 
regime. However, they should use what agency is available to them to maintain that regime 
and, if at all possible, stabilise it. Indeed, a particularly skilful exponent of disjunctive 
leadership may be able maintain a dysfunctional regime if not indefinitely, then at least for a 
prolonged period. Policy experimentation may be one tactic which profits disjunctive leaders, 
but it will be motivated by regime stabilisation rather than as an act of conscious grace for a 
reconstructive successor. They should seek to prevent enervation escalating into crisis but 
stand ready to deploy their crisis management skills to preserve the status quo.  They should 
use their agency to frustrate reconstructive appeals emerging from their own, or opposition 
parties. Indeed, they should attempt to preserve the unity of the coalition of interests 
supporting the regime and resist attempts to shift the main axis of partisan cleavage.  Such 
efforts are most likely to succeed if the prime minister can convincingly deploy the warrants 
for authority that they construct. A successful disjunctive prime minister would find their 
claims to authority accepted by their party, the electorate, the commentariat and perhaps even 
by opposition parties. In addition, their success will increase if they can avoid or manage the 
dilemmas characteristic to the disjunctive premiership identified above. Effective setting of 
expectations, projection of a clear policy vision, effective party management and the 
marginalisation of maverick and populist critics are challenges which a successful disjunctive 
prime minister will meet.  
 
Cameron’s warrants to governing authority 
 
Although Cameron possessed considerable political experience (Barber 2013) he doubtless 
recognised advising John Major, Norman Lamont and Michael Howard did not represent the 
best warrant for authority. Instead, Cameron stressed his personal determination to take tough 
decisions without hesitation. This particularly applied to addressing Britain’s debt ‘crisis’ 
(see, for example, Cameron 2010b; 2010e) but also grasping the nettle of relations with 
Europe (Cameron 2013) and confronting demands for Scottish independence (Cameron 
2014a). Secondly, he emphasised how his personal values equipped him to take these tough 
decisions. For Cameron stabilisation and rehabilitation of the regime above all demanded 
promotion of responsibility. Deficit reduction demanded financial responsibility. Stabilisation 
of financial institutions required responsible behaviour by bankers. Only responsible action 
by communities, families and individuals would address social problems. A claim to personal 
competence only became plausible after some time in office. Here, opinion polls 
demonstrated that Cameron succeeded in convincing a majority of voters that he was a 
capable leader, particularly relative to his Labour counterparts. This formed a key component 
of the warrant Cameron advanced as his claim for a second term. He was a competent prime 
minister possessing a long-term economic plan (see, for example, Cameron 2014a).  
 
Cameron also successfully deployed narratives embedded during the financial crisis. He 
entered office at ‘a grave moment in the modern history of Britain’ (Cameron 2012), facing 
‘the worst inheritance of any incoming government for at least sixty years’ (Cameron 2010b) 
with ‘public finances that can only be described as catastrophic’ (Cameron 2010c). These 
narratives served several purposes. They lowered expectations and disassociated Cameron 
from responsibility for causing the nation’s economic difficulties. They provided political 
cover when growth and deficit reduction targets were missed. They also hampered Labour’s 
efforts to restore its economic credibility. Cameron and Osborne consequently enjoyed a 
significant opinion poll lead on economic matters throughout the 2010-15 parliament with 
voters assigning primary responsibility for the UK’s economic difficulties to Labour.  
 
Cameron accompanied warnings of national peril with claims to act in the national rather 
than partisan or sectional interest. This served as the public rationale for coalition until 2015. 
He and Clegg were ‘political leaders who want to put aside party differences and work hard 
for the common good and for the national interest’ (Cameron 2010d) particularly to secure 
the stability demanded by financial markets. Cameron also presented his austerity measures 
as national rather than sectional. He would claim in June 2010, ‘We are not driven by some 
theory or some ideology. We are doing this as a government because we have to, driven by 
the urgent truth that unless we do so, people will suffer and our national interest will suffer 
too.’ (Cameron 2010e)  
 
However, several of Cameron’s warrants appeared less compelling after five years in office. 
His claim to serve national rather than partisan or sectional interests was eroded. Abolition of 
the 50p top rate of tax was presented as benefitting Conservative ministers, donors and core 
voters (see HC Deb (2012-13) 560 cols. 948-949). Criticism grew that austerity measures 
disproportionately affected the most vulnerable. Indeed, Labour gained some traction with its 
ambitions to create a fairer Britain and robustly challenge sectional interests (see, for 
example, Miliband 2012). By the 2015 election, the public grew sceptical of Cameron’s 
claim to serve the national interest: 65% believed Cameron was out of touch with ordinary 
people by April 2015.  
 
Cameron and the dilemmas of disjunctive leadership 
 
As noted above, disjunctive prime ministers often struggle to establish a clear policy vision. 
Constant reiteration of the parlous conditions in which he governed carried the risk that 
audiences grew deaf to Cameron’s other objectives; ‘Too often we’ve given the impression 
that we’re just about fixing problems rather than changing things for a purpose.’ (Cameron 
2014b) If Cameron succeeded in establishing deficit reduction as his duty, he failed to convey 
a more positive vision. Enthusiasm for the ‘Big Society’ faded quickly and Cameron 
switched to a vision of British success in ‘the global race’ (see Cameron 2012). Neither 
gained traction with the commentariat, the public, or Conservative MPs.  
 
Cameron also fell victim to avoidable errors, policy failures and noticeable u-turns. A 
sequence of errors and retreats in the government’s first year led to complaints about a lack 
of ‘grip’ and competence by No.10. However, a strengthened centre, including a u-turn on 
the self-imposed limit on the numbers of special advisers, failed to halt the sequence of mis-
steps. In economic policy, the 2012 Budget descended into an ‘omnishambles’. The 2012 
Autumn Statement acknowledged the deficit would not be cleared before the end of the 
parliament. By 2013 the AAA credit rating that Cameron had pledged to defend had been 
surrendered. Targets to reduce immigration to ‘tens of thousands’ were predictably (Bale and 
Hampshire 2012) missed. Universal Credit, the centrepiece of welfare reform, was serially 
delayed. Yet, such difficulties did not significantly damage Cameron’s personal reputation 
during his first term for several reasons. Firstly, Cameron possessed accomplished 
presentational skills exceeding those of many of his disjunctive predecessors (see, for 
example, Hurd 1979, 81). Secondly, he did not confront a more dynamic, resolute or capable 
Leader of the Opposition with the instinct to capitalise on such incompetence (Bale 2015, 
262). Thirdly, the print media remained broadly sympathetic. If some Conservative 
supporting newspapers were hostile to Cameron, they reserved greater vitriol for Ed 
Miliband. 
 
With 35% of all divisions witnessing rebellions by coalition MPs, the 2010-15 parliament 
was the most rebellious since 1945 (Cowley 2015). Many of these rebellions had little lasting 
significance. However, several demonstrated fundamental divisions within Conservative 
ranks. Large scale rebellions on an EU referendum and the EU budget signalled the 
hardening of Eurosceptic opinion. Defeat on military intervention in Syria undermined 
Cameron’s authority on foreign policy. Many Conservative parliamentarians were furious 
that the Liberal Democrats secured a referendum on AV and 91 rebelled against House of 
Lords reform. The majority of Conservative MPs refused to support same-sex marriage 
revealing a conflict between Cameron’s social liberalism and the social conservative plurality 
in his parliamentary party (Heppell 2013a). Indeed, for many in his party, Cameron seemed 
an inauthentic voice of conservatism. Yet, without a consensus on a replacement and the 
failure of a well-organised faction to gain ascendancy (Norton 2015) Cameron escaped a 
leadership challenge.  
 
Cameron also confronted maverick, populist politicians who secured considerable support. 
Both Boris Johnson and Nigel Farage developed iconoclastic appeals, projecting an 
authenticity and conviction which eluded the political class, Cameron included. Public 
disagreements between Johnson and Cameron emerged on immigration, the ‘bedroom tax’ 
and transport policy. But beyond serving his own ambitions and the interests of London there 
was little evidence of a coherent alternative prospectus. While confined to City Hall he 
represented a distraction rather than a menace to Cameron. In contrast, Cameron struggled to 
find an effective strategy to counter UKIP. Nigel Farage staked a claim to reconstructive 
leadership as a tribune for those alienated from mainstream parties and the existing regime. 
While Farage threatened other parties, Conservative voters (Ford, Goodwin, and Cutts 2012), 
members (Webb and Bale 2014) and parliamentarians were all potentially drawn towards 
UKIP. Here Farage outbid Cameron with a demand for an immediate EU referendum and 
was well positioned to attack missed immigration targets. Together these issues provided 
Farage with a platform to question Cameron’s capacity to deliver his warrant to serve the 
national interest. However, given the alienation from mainstream politics felt by many UKIP 
supporters it wasn’t clear that a more viable alternative to Cameron’s strategy of appeasing 
UKIP was available, or that another Conservative leader could discover it (Ford and 
Goodwin 2014, 283-4). 
 
Cameron and regime vulnerability 
 
Harold Wilson bemoaned that ‘Crises are not in the habit of forming queues.’ (Wilson 1979, 
20) Cameron proved more fortunate. The regime vulnerability he encountered was 
characterised by ‘a domino effect’ (Richards and Smith 2014, 3). The various institutional 
and political calamities of 2010-15 largely followed a sequence. The emergence of a ‘hybrid 
media system’ assisted Cameron here. Critical stories gained traction more quickly but also 
tended to burn out much faster (see Chadwick 2013, 64). But most significantly, Cameron’s 
mainstream political opponents did not fashion these episodes into a compelling 
reconstructive narrative. Miliband capitalised upon some of Cameron’s strategic dilemmas 
and errors and set the political agenda on some issues, particularly energy prices. However, 
Labour’s positioning in political time assisted Cameron in managing an enervated regime. 
Although Labour’s growth strategy appeared to promise a radical transition from Anglo-
American capitalism the party ultimately made a more cautious appeal to the electorate (Bale 
2015). Labour consequently did not make a consistent or compelling case for political 
reconstruction. 
 
In exercising his own agency in regime management, Cameron’s ‘essay crisis’ mode of 
leadership quickly became a cliché. On this account Cameron rose to the occasion when 
crisis loomed but quickly returned to ‘stand-by mode’ (Behr 2011). But what was perceived 
as detachment was actually part of the strategic repertoire of a disjunctive prime minister: a 
desire to stabilise the situation in the short-term in the hope that conditions will change in the 
future. Such a strategy nevertheless had mixed success. Cameron failed to ride out the phone-
hacking scandal and save Andy Coulson but he succeeded in consigning the Leveson 
Inquiry’s less welcome recommendations to limbo.  
 
Despite initial success in minimising centre-periphery conflict (Convery 2014), the Union 
became significantly more vulnerable by 2015. In the absence of a counter-factual it is 
impossible to assess whether denying the SNP a two-question referendum and agreeing to a 
two-year timescale for the referendum was a strategic error. Moreover, Cameron’s 
responsibility for the pro-Union referendum campaign was limited. With the exception of the 
last minute intervention to ‘vow’ additional powers, Conservative toxicity in Scotland 
relegated Cameron to a bystander. Nevertheless, the Yes victory was much less emphatic 
than had been anticipated and, in spite of their defeat, the SNP’s membership and support 
continued to grow. In this context, the ‘wicked problems’ of the Barnett Formula and the 
West Lothian Question could not remain quarantined, nor could a second independence 
referendum be foreclosed.  
 
Cameron’s greatest success was buying time on the economy. He effectively magnified the 
regime’s economic difficulties on entering office. These did not justify the apocalyptic billing 
they received. For example, the coalition inherited a deficit that was the smallest in the G7 as 
a proportion of GDP. Most UK debt was long-term and held domestically meaning that a 
replay of the Greek, Spanish, Portuguese or Irish crises was always unlikely. Nevertheless, 
economic growth slumped after Cameron took office. It took until 2014 for the economy to 
surpass its pre-crisis peak and the timetable for deficit reduction was amended. But economic 
growth had strengthened and unemployment had fallen significantly in time for the 2015 
election. Cameron’s ambitions to rebalance the economy away from reliance on debt and 
personal consumption nevertheless made little progress (Berry and Hay 2014). A long-term 
solution to the underpinning vulnerabilities of the UK’s political economy remained to be 
discovered.  
 
The downfall of a disjunctive prime minister 
 
That Cameron secured a second term at the 2015 general election was a marker of how 
successfully, overall, he had performed as a disjunctive prime minister during his first term. 
Following the 2015 election it was not impossible to imagine he might escape the constraints 
of disjunctive politics and become a second term orthodox innovator or reconstructive leader. 
For a prime minister, political time can change during their tenure. Regime vulnerability may 
change whether as a result of prime ministerial agency or changing structural conditions. 
Prime ministers may revise or advance new warrants for authority. Prime ministers may 
move within and possibly between the quadrants of Figure 1 over time. 
 
However, for Cameron to have become an orthodox innovator would demand a degree of 
regime resilience that he failed to engineer in his first term. Cameron failed to resolve the 
pathologies of an enervated regime. He also failed to construct a new electoral coalition. 
While a triumph over expectations, 36.8% of the vote and a majority of twelve did not 
compare with the electoral authority secured by reconstructive prime ministers like Attlee 
and Thatcher. Cameron was the least-worst alternative for many voters and his success rested 
upon his opponent’s misfortunes - his coalition partners’ electoral collapse (providing 27 of 
37 Conservative gains) and Labour’s disintegration in Scotland. Secondly, Cameron did not 
construct new warrants for authority that would support reconstruction. He appealed to 
‘safety first’, stressing competence and exploiting concerns about Labour’s economic 
management and the threat of instability posed by the SNP.  
 
Indeed, Cameron had limited authority to pursue reconstructive ambitions should he have 
possessed them. Many of the constraints encountered in his first term persisted. Party 
management remained a challenge; his second term government possessed a smaller 
Commons majority than that of the coalition. Defeats followed on the ‘purdah’ rules for the 
2016 EU referendum and the relaxation of Sunday trading laws. Elsewhere, a series of u-
turns and concessions followed on issues including tax credits, personal independence 
payments, pension tax relief, child refugees, academisation of schools, and the provision of a 
training programme for Saudi Arabian prisons.  
 
However, the chief problem of Cameron’s second term was Europe. Eurosceptic sentiment in 
the UK had grown to new levels in the wake of the financial and Eurozone crises. In 2013 
Cameron succeeded in buying time, finding a commitment to a referendum on renegotiated 
terms of membership served as a short-term basis for uniting most shades of opinion within 
his party. However, Cameron was also boxed in by this commitment. Consequently, 
renegotiation and the referendum came to dominate the political agenda after May 2015. This 
inhibited Cameron from developing any broader policy vision for his second term while the 
ensuing uncertainty threatened his warrant to deliver stability and reassurance to the markets.  
 
Cameron’s fundamental difficulty was that there was no guarantee that he could secure 
‘fundamental, far-reaching change’ (Cameron, 2013) satisfactory to his party or the 
electorate. Reform proposals unveiled in November 2015 represented far less than this stated 
ambition to Eurosceptics (see, HC Deb (2015-16) 602 col. 232, 236). The settlement that 
followed in February 2016 in turn fell short of even these proposals, particularly in regard to 
free movement and access to benefits. The EU referendum campaign accordingly exposed 
divisions within Conservative ranks. A fifth of the Cabinet and two-fifths of Conservative 
MPs rejected Cameron’s renegotiation. The referendum also provided a platform for populist, 
anti-establishment politics. Cameron now not only had to counter the populist appeal of Nigel 
Farage and UKIP, but also that of Boris Johnson who, having returned to Westminster at the 
2015 election, took on a leading role in the ‘leave’ campaign.   
 
Whereas Cameron emerged victorious in the 2011 AV referendum and, less convincingly, the 
2014 Scottish independence referendum, the electorate rejected his renegotiated EU deal by a 
margin of 52% to 48%. Cameron bore responsibility for initiating the referendum, for failing 
to manage expectations regarding the renegotiation, for agreeing a deal which failed to 
satisfactorily address key Eurosceptic concerns and, at least in part, for a lacklustre remain 
campaign. However, once set in train, Cameron’s decisions also unleashed longer-run and 
structural forces beyond both his control and the capacity of the political regime to address – 
namely the growing salience of immigration as a political concern and the alienation of those 
‘left behind’ by the economic and social changes associated with this political regime.  
 
The result, inevitably, meant the end of Cameron’s premiership. At the moment of his 
resignation the political regime which he had affiliated to was left in a position of profound 
vulnerability. A degree of political uncertainty and division followed which had been 
unknown in British politics since the 1970s, perhaps even since the 1930s.  Beyond the 
immediate market volatility lay the uncertainty and political challenges associated with years 
of withdrawal negotiations which would reverse the uploading of state responsibilities to the 
EU undertaken over forty-three years. Questions now surfaced which placed many regime 
commitments, some long sedimented, under question. With Scotland having voted to remain, 
the prospect of a second independence referendum grew. Significant implications also 
followed for Northern Ireland given the centrality of European integration to the Good Friday 
Agreement and the prospect of a hard border with the Republic of Ireland. The referendum 
also generated a profound dilemma of reconciling the desire of Britain’s financial services 
industry to maintain its access to the EU single market with the desires for control of 
immigration and repatriation of sovereignty expressed by supporters of the ‘leave’ campaign.   
 
Conclusion: David Cameron in political time 
 
Cameron and his acolytes held an undisguised admiration for Tony Blair and Labour’s 
modernisers. Yet, his standing within his own party was also often assessed by reference to 
Margaret Thatcher (Evans 2010). Our argument is that both represent ill-judged comparisons 
to evaluate Cameron’s premiership. British prime ministers find their leadership qualities 
tested in different circumstances and Thatcher and Blair were situated in different points in 
political time to Cameron, with different options available to them in terms of the 
management of the political regime. Viewed through the lens of Skowronek’s political time 
model, Cameron was a disjunctive prime minister between 2010 and 2016, best evaluated 
alongside others, like Heath (1970-74), Wilson (1974-76) and Callaghan (1976-79), who 
were affiliated to a vulnerable regime.  
 
Cameron inherited an enervated regime. During his first term, he negotiated the constraints 
and challenges of disjunctive leadership relatively successfully.  He effectively deployed 
many of the warrants to authority he constructed. He fostered an image of competence 
relative to his rivals. He disassociated himself from responsibility for many regime failings 
and lowered expectations effectively. He was able to claim credit for strengthening economic 
growth and forestalled potentially regime changing reforms including electoral reform and 
statutory regulation of the press. However, his claim to prioritise national above sectional and 
partisan interests did not survive untarnished. Cameron also failed to escape many of the 
dilemmas of disjunctive leadership. His party was divided and his government committed a 
series of policy mistakes and u-turns. In his second term Cameron faced the challenge of 
meeting the expectations he had generated on the issue of renegotiation on EU membership. 
This was to prove a challenge beyond the skills of disjunctive leadership he demonstrated 
between 2010 and 2015, particularly because it placed stresses on the fault lines running 
below the political regime. The result was a political earthquake.  His successor, Theresa 
May, inherited a regime at best in a heightened state of enervation, at worst tipped into a state 
of political crisis.    
 
 
 
 
References 
Bale, T. (2015) Five Year Mission: The Labour Party Under Ed Miliband (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press). 
Bale, T. and Hampshire, J. (2012) ‘Immigration Policy’, in T. Heppell and D. Seawright 
(eds.), Cameron and the Conservatives: The Transition to Coalition Government 
(Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan), 89–104. 
Banaszak, L. A., Beckwith, K. and Rucht, D., (2003) ‘When Power Relocates: Interactive 
Changes in Movements and States’ in L. A. Banaszak, K. Beckwith and D. Rucht (eds.), 
Women’s Movements Facing the Reconfigured State (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press), 1-29.  
Barber, S. (2013) ‘Arise, Careerless Politician: The Rise of the Professional Party Leader’, 
Politics, 34:1, 23–31. 
Behr, R. (2011) ‘Cameron’s leadership — a holiday persistently interrupted by reality’. 
Available from: http://www.newstatesman.com/uk-politics/2011/08/prime-minister-cameron-
holiday  
Berry, C. and Hay, C. (2014) ‘The Great British “Rebalancing” Act: The Construction and 
Implementation of an Economic Imperative for Exceptional Times’, The British Journal of 
Politics & International Relations, n/a–n/a. 
Blair, T. (2007) ‘Tony Blair's “Media” Speech: The Prime Ministers Reuters Speech on 
Public Life’, Political Quarterly, 78:4, 476–87. 
Buller, J. and James, T. S. (2012) ‘Statecraft and the Assessment of National Political 
Leaders: The Case of New Labour and Tony Blair’, The British Journal of Politics & 
International Relations, 14:4, 534–55. 
Buller, J. and James, T. S. (2015) ‘Integrating Structural Context into the Assessment of 
Political Leadership: Philosophical Realism, Gordon Brown and the Great Financial Crisis’, 
Parliamentary Affairs, 68:1, 77–96. 
Bulpitt, J. (1986) ‘The Discipline of the New Democracy: Mrs Thatcher's Domestic 
Statecraft’, Political Studies, 34:1, 19–39. 
Bulpitt, J. (2008) Territory and Power in the United Kingdom. An Interpretation (Colchester: 
ECPR Press) 
Cameron, D. (2008) ‘Leader’s speech, Birmingham 2008’. Available from: 
http://www.britishpoliticalspeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech=153  
Cameron, D. (2010a) ‘Prime Minister’s speech on the economy’. Available from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/prime-ministers-speech-on-the-economy  
Cameron, D. (2010b) ‘National interest first’. Available from: 
http://www.webarchive.org.uk/wayback/archive/20100702005505/http://www.conservatives.
com/News/Speeches/2010/05/David_Cameron_National_interest_first.aspx  
Cameron, D. (2010c) ‘Leader's speech, Birmingham 2010’. Available from: 
http://www.britishpoliticalspeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech=214  
Cameron, D. (2010d) ‘David Cameron: Statement in Downing Street’. Available from: 
http://www.webarchive.org.uk/wayback/archive/20100702005508/http://www.conservatives.
com/News/Speeches/2010/05/David_Cameron_Statement_in_Downing_Street.aspx  
Cameron, D. (2010e) ‘Prime Minister's speech on the economy’. Available from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/prime-ministers-speech-on-the-economy  
Cameron, D. (2012) ‘Leader's speech, Birmingham 2012’. Available from: 
http://www.britishpoliticalspeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech= 
Cameron, D. (2013) ‘EU Speech at Bloomberg’. Available from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/eu-speech-at-bloomberg  
Cameron, D. (2014a) ‘Speech to Conservative Party Conference 2014’. Available from: 
http://press.conservatives.com/post/98882674910/david-cameron-speech-to-conservative-
party  
Cameron, D. (2014b) ‘The values that underpin our longterm economic plan’. Available 
from: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-values-that-underpin-our-long-term-
economic-plan  
Chadwick, A. (2013) The Hybrid Media System (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
Clarke, C., James, T., Bale, T and Diamond, P. (eds.) (2015) British Conservative Leaders 
(London: Biteback Publishing). 
Conservative Party (2010) Invitation to Join the Government of Britain. The Conservative 
Manifesto 2010 (London: Conservative Party). 
Convery, A. (2014) ‘Devolution and the Limits of Tory Statecraft: The Conservative Party in 
Coalition and Scotland and Wales’, Parliamentary Affairs, 67:1, 25–44. 
Cowley, P. (2015) ‘The most rebellious parliament of the post-war era’. Available from: 
http://www.psa.ac.uk/insight-plus/blog/most-rebellious-parliament-post-war-era  
Crockett, D. A. (2012) ‘The Historical Presidency. The Perils of Restoration Politics: 
Nineteenth‐Century Antecedents’, Presidential Studies Quarterly, 42:4,  881–902.  
Evans, S. (2010) ‘“Mother’s Boy”: David Cameron and Margaret Thatcher’, The British 
Journal of Politics & International Relations, 12:3, 325–43. 
Finlayson, A. (2011) ‘Cameron, Culture and the Creative Class: The Big Society and the 
Post‐Bureaucratic Age’, The Political Quarterly, 82:s1, 35–47. 
Ford, R. and Goodwin, M. (2014) Revolt on the Right. Explaining Support for the Radical 
Right in Britain (London: Routledge). 
Ford, R., Goodwin, M. J. and Cutts, D. (2012) ‘Strategic Eurosceptics and polite xenophobes: 
support for the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) in the 2009 European 
Parliament elections’, European Journal of Political Research, 51:2, 204–34. 
Gamble, A. (2014) Crisis Without End? The Unravelling of Western Prosperity (Houndmills: 
Palgrave Macmillan). 
Greenstein, F. I. (2001) The Presidential Difference: Leadership style from FDR to Clinton 
(New York: The Free Press). 
Hay, C. (2013) ‘Pathology Without Crisis? The Strange Demise of the Anglo-Liberal Growth 
Model’, Government and Opposition, 46:1, 1–31. 
Heffernan, R. (2005) ‘Why the Prime Minister cannot be a President: Comparing Institutional 
Imperatives in Britain and America’, Parliamentary Affairs, 58:1, 53–70. 
Heppell, T. (2013a) ‘Cameron and Liberal Conservatism: Attitudes within the Parliamentary 
Conservative Party and Conservative Ministers’, British Journal of Politics & International 
Relations, 15:3, 340–61. 
Heppell, T. (2013b) ‘Prime Ministers and their Parties in the United Kingdom’, in P. 
Strangio, P. ‘t Hart, and J. Walter (eds.), Understanding Prime-Ministerial Performance: 
Comparative Perspectives (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 129–150. 
Hindmoor, A. and McConnell, A. (2013) ‘Why Didn't They See it Coming? Warning Signs, 
Acceptable Risks and the Global Financial Crisis’, Political Studies, 61:3, 543–60. 
Hoekstra, D. J. (1999) ‘The Politics of Politics: Skowronek and Presidential Research’, 
Presidential Studies Quarterly, 29:3, 657–71. 
Hurd, D. (1979) An End to Promises. Sketch of a Government, 1970-74 (London: Collins). 
Jessop, B. (2007) ‘New Labour or The Normalization of Neo-Liberalism?’ British Politics, 
2:2, 282-288. 
Laing, M. and McCaffrie, B. (2013) ‘The Politics Prime Ministers Make: Political Time and 
Executive Leadership in Westminster Systems’, in P. Strangio, P. ‘t Hart and J. Walter (eds.), 
Understanding Prime-Ministerial Performance (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 79–101. 
Laing, M. and McCaffrie, B. (2015) ‘The Impossible Leadership Situation? Analyzing 
Success for Disjunctive Presidents’, Paper presented at the Western Political Science 
Association, Las Vegas, 2 April.  
Marquand, D. (1988) The Unprincipled Society. (London: Jonathan Cape). 
Marquand, D. (2011) ‘Biography’, in M. Flinders, A. Gamble, C. Hay, and M. Kenny (eds.), 
The Oxford Handbook of British Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 187–200. 
McCaffrie, B. (2012) ‘Understanding the Success of Presidents and Prime Ministers: The 
Role of Opposition Parties’, Australian Journal of Political Science, 47:2, 257–71. 
McCaffrie, B. (2013) ‘A contextual framework for assessing reconstructive prime ministerial 
success’, Policy Studies, 34:5-6, 618–37. 
Miliband, E. (2012) ‘Ed Miliband's speech to Labour Party Annual Conference 2012’. 
Available from: http://archive.labour.org.uk/ed-miliband-speech-conf-2012  
Moran, M. (2003) The British Regulatory State: High Modernism and Hyper-innovation. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
Nichols, C. and Myers, A. S. (2010) ‘Exploiting the Opportunity for Reconstructive 
Leadership: Presidential Responses to Enervated Political Regimes’, American Politics 
Research, 38:5, 806–841 
Norton, P. (2015) ‘The coalition and the Conservatives’, in A. Seldon and M. Finn (eds.), The 
Coalition Effect 2010-2015 (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 467–91. 
Phillips, M., and Simpson, I. (2015) ‘Disengaged and disconnected? Trends in attitudes 
towards politics’, in J. Curtice and R. Ormston (eds.), British Social Attitudes: the 32nd 
Report (London: NatCen Social Research), 123–145. 
Richards, D. and Smith, M. J. (2014) ‘Introduction: A Crisis in UK Institutions?’, in D. 
Richards, M. J. Smith and C. Hay (eds.), Institutional Crisis in 21st Century Britain. 
(Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan), 1–12. 
Skowronek, S. (1993) The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from John Adams to George 
Bush. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press). 
Skowronek, S. (2011) Presidential Leadership in Political Time: Reprise and Reappraisal, 
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas). 
‘t Hart, P. (2014a) ‘Contextual Analysis’, in R. A. W. Rhodes and P. ‘t Hart (eds.), The 
Oxford Handbook of Political Leadership (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 210–224. 
‘t Hart, P. (2014b) Understanding Public Leadership (London: Palgrave Macmillan). 
Theakston, K. (2007) ‘What Makes for an Effective British Prime Minister?’, Quaderni di 
Scienza Politica, 14:2, 39–61. 
Theakston, K. (2011) ‘Gordon Brown as prime minister: Political skills and leadership style’, 
British Politics, 6:1, 78–100.  
Theakston, K. (2012) ‘David Cameron as Prime Minister’, in T. Heppell and D. Seawright 
(eds.), Cameron and the Conservatives: The Transition to Coalition Government 
(Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan), 194–208. 
Theakston, K. and Gill, M. (2006) ‘Rating 20th‐Century British Prime Ministers’, The British 
Journal of Politics & International Relations, 8:2, 193–213. 
Webb, P. and Bale, T. (2014) ‘Why Do Tories Defect to UKIP? Conservative Party Members 
and the Temptations of the Populist Radical Right’, Political Studies, 62:4, 961–70. 
Whiteley, P., Clarke, H. D., Sanders, D. and Stewart, M. C. (2013) Affluence, Austerity and 
Electoral Change in Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
Wilson, H. (1979) Final Term: The Labour Government, 1974-1976 (London: Michael 
Joseph). 
 
  
Table 1. Skowronek’s typology of leaders, regimes and patterns of politics 
 
 AFFILIATED LEADER OPPOSED LEADER 
RESILIENT REGIME Articulation Pre-emption 
VULNERABLE REGIME Disjunction Reconstruction 
 
 
  
Figure 1: Regime Vulnerability and Affiliation in Political Time 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Affiliated to 
regime 
 
Opposed to 
regime 
Resilient regime 
Vulnerable regime 
Disjunction 
Reconstruction 
Articulation Pre-emption 
  
 
 
 
 
Source: British Social Attitudes Surveys 
 
0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
60.0%
70.0%
80.0%
90.0%
100.0%
1987 1994 2009 2012
Figure 2: Institutional trust: percentage saying institution is 
well run
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